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Abstract: This note uncovers the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ perceived by
U.S. monetary policymakers. For that purpose we use data on individual
forecasts for unemployment and inﬂation submitted by each individual
FOMC member, which was recently made available for the period 1992-
1998. The results point to signiﬁcant changes in the perceived trade-oﬀ
over time with the Phillips curve ﬂattening and the implied NAIRU falling
towards the second half of the sample. Hence, the results suggest that
policymakers were aware of these changes in real-time.
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For central bankers, understanding the short-run trade-oﬀ between real economy ac-
tivity and inﬂation, also known as the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ, is of paramount im-
portance. It is now well known that the Phillips curve ﬂattened since the beginning
of the 1980s, a stylized fact ﬁrst noted by Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). The period
of sustained growth in the second half of the 1990s in the absence of inﬂationary
pressure is widely believed to reﬂect a further signiﬁcant structural change in the
underlying trade-oﬀ. Due to favorable productivity shocks, the argument goes, the
Non-Accelerating Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) fell.
When did policymakers notice this change and, if so, how did they react?2 These
questions are diﬃcult to address based on aggregate macroeconomic data, let alone
ex-post revised data. Researchers typically focus on verbal transcripts to illustrate
how uncertainty about the Phillips curve aﬀected Federal Reserve decision making.
Meade and Thornton (2008), for example, study the debate within the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) about the Phillips curve in the 1990s. They document
that the FOMC transcripts contain a dramatic increase in references to keywords
such as "potential output", "Phillips curve", and "NAIRU" towards the second half
of the 1990s. They also list examples of FOMC members expressing doubt about the
reliability of the Phillips curve as a guideline for interest rate policy. An alternative
approach is oﬀered by Ball and Tchaidze (2002). They show that a standard Tay-
lor rule can replicate interest rate setting during the late 1990s only once a falling
NAIRU is taken into account. In the 1990s, the Federal Reserve Board’s main macro-
econometric model, FRB/US, underwent various changes. Tetlow and Ironside (2007)
document 30 model vintages. They show that the changing model properties are con-
sistent with a falling NAIRU and a ﬂatter Phillips curve.
This paper addresses these potential changes in the unemployment-inﬂation nexus and
elicits the perception of the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ implicit in forecasts of inﬂation
and unemployment of each individual member of the FOMC. Instead of relying on
aggregate data or verbal statements, this paper infers the real-time beliefs about this
issue directly from policymakers’ quantitative forecasts. For this purpose, we employ
2This uncertainty about the Phillips curve relation let research such as Gorodnichenko and Shapiro
(2007) refer to monetary policy as the "growth gamble" of the Fed in the second half of the 1990s.
For a survey on the emergence of the New Economy and the response of monetary policy see Wynne
(2002).
2a data set on individual forecasts, that is, forecasts for inﬂation and unemployment of
each individual FOMC member, which was recently made available in Romer (2009).
By submitting these forecast twice a year, each FOMC member is forced to reveal his
notion of the trade-oﬀ between real activity and inﬂation. The data set covers the
period 1992-1998, which is the period of heightened uncertainty about the usefulness
of the Phillips curve.
We estimate a Phillips curve based on the real-time output gap as a driving variable
and, alternatively, with unemployment as the measure of real activity. The former
speciﬁcation allows us to infer changes in the slope over time. The latter speciﬁ-
c a t i o nc a nb eu s e dt oe l i c i tt h eN A I R Ui m p l i e db ye a c hm e m b e r ’ sc o m b i n a t i o no f
unemployment and inﬂation forecasts
The results point to signiﬁcant changes in the slope of the perceived Phillips curve over
time with the Phillips curve ﬂattening towards the second half of the sample. While
individual forecasts reﬂect a positively sloped Phillips curve in the early 1990s, there
appears to be no signiﬁcant relation between inﬂation and the output gap towards the
end of the sample. The estimates also suggest that the NAIRU fell over time from
about 6.9% in 1992-1994 to 5.3% after 1996. Hence, we conclude that the FOMC
forecasts are consistent with the notion that the Phillips curve changed during the
second half of the 1990s and that, on average, FOMC members took that into account
when submitting their forecasts.
This note is organized as follows. Section two introduces FOMC forecasts and presents
the data set. Section three contains the empirical approach and discusses the results.
Section four draws some tentative conclusions.
2F O M C f o r e c a s t s
Twice a year at its February and July meetings the FOMC publishes the monetary
policy report to congress (Humphrey-Hawkins report). It contains forecasts of, among
other variables, unemployment and the inﬂation rate. Each FOMC member submits
her own forecasts, after intensive brieﬁng by the FOMC staﬀ.T h e s t a ﬀ publishes
its own set of forecasts in the Greenbook, which is continuously available to FOMC
members. Until recently, however, individual forecasts were kept secret. The pub-
lished report only contains a range of forecasts and the midpoint of this range, also
known as the central tendency.
3These data received some attention in recent years. Gavin (2003) evaluates the in-
formation content of the central tendency and the FOMC’s forecasting record, while
Gavin and Mandal (2003) compare forecast accuracy between the FOMC, the private
sector, and the staﬀ. Likewise, Romer and Romer (2008) compare FOMC forecasts
with Federal Reserve staﬀ forecasts. They provokingly argue that the FOMC forecasts
do not contain useful information beyond that already incorporated in staﬀ forecasts.
Diﬀerences between FOMC and staﬀ forecasts are shown to predict monetary shocks.
Gavin and Pande (2008) use data from the survey of professional forecasters to mimic
the FOMC’s forecasting method and analyse the diﬀerent measures of forecast con-
sensus.
Recently, Romer (2009) constructs a data set containing each individual FOMC fore-
cast for the period 1992-1998. With this publication, the interest in FOMC forecasting
is most likely to be revived. The present paper is the ﬁrst attempt to use this data
set.3 We use this data set to uncover policymakers’ beliefs about the Phillips curve
trade-oﬀ. By setting a forecast of unemployment and inﬂation, each FOMC member
implicitly reveals her perception of the short-run trade-oﬀ between these two vari-
ables.4 In this respect, the short sample period available to the researcher is not a
serious restriction as this time span reﬂects the period of policymakers’ heightened
uncertainty about possible changes in the trade-oﬀ due to favorable shift in produc-
tivity.
In the July report, the FOMC prepares forecasts for the following calender year (this
forecast will be indexed by | +1 8hereafter) and the current calender year (in-
dexed by |+6). The February report contains forecasts for the current calender
year (|+12). The inﬂation forecast is the expected forth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter
change of the CPI, while the unemployment forecast refers to the rate of unemploy-
ment in the last quarter of the year. The forecasts are supposed to be conditional
on each member’s own judgement of the "appropriate policy" path over the forecast
horizon.
For each of the three diﬀerent forecasts per year, i.e. one at the February meeting
and two at the July meeting, the data set contains 120 pairs of forecasts for inﬂation
and the unemployment rate. We use these individual FOMC forecasts to address the
following questions. First, how do FOMC members perceive the trade-oﬀ between the
3All data series about FOMC forecasts used in this paper are available at David Romer’s website
under http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~dromer/.
4The data set does not contain forecasts from the chairman.
4output gap and inﬂation? Put diﬀerently, is there a systematic relationship between
their inﬂation forecast and the last observation on the output gap prior to submitting
the inﬂation forecast? Second, how does the perceived slope of the Phillips curve
change over time? Third, what is the NAIRU implied by the combined forecasts for
inﬂation and unemployment. Note that this paper does not evaluate issues of forecast
accuracy or forecast rationality. Throughout the exercise we maintain the assumption
that strategic motives in forecasting were absent.
3 Empirical evidence
We proceed in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the inﬂation forecasts are related to past
inﬂation and the output gap in order to infer the slope of the Phillips curve that is
consistent with each member’s forecast. In a second step, the inﬂation forecast is
related to the unemployment forecast. This allows us to extract the NAIRU implied
by each individual set of forecasts.
3.1 The Phillips curve as implied by FOMC forecasts
The reduced form speciﬁcation used in this section relates the February or, alterna-




|+6, to the last observations on
inﬂation and the output gap available at each FOMC meeting. For the February
forecast, the model is


|+12 − |−12 = 0 + 1|−3 +  (1)
while the speciﬁcation for the July forecast is given by


|+6 − |−12 = 0 + 1|−3 +  (2)
A similar speciﬁcation is used frequently in the literature, e.g. Clark and McCracken
(2006). The last year-on-year inﬂation ﬁgure available to the policymaker at the
time of the meeting is denoted by |−12 and |−12. The output gap over the
proceeding quarter is |−3 or |−3. We also include a constant 0.D a t a o n
inﬂation is taken from the FRED database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
The output gap, i.e. the percentage deviation of output from potential, is taken
from the Fed’s Greenbook. Hence, is corresponds to the real-time data the FOMC
members had at hand when formulating forecasts. This data comes from the real-time
5database at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. If FOMC members raise their
inﬂation forecast in light of current output gap data, the coeﬃcient 1 is expected
to be positive. To the extent the decision makers loose faith in the Phillips curve
relationship, the coeﬃcient 1 will fall over time.
The results are presented in table (1). In almost all speciﬁcations, the slope coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcantly positive. Moreover, the Phillips curve ﬂattens over time. Take the
February forecasts as an example. In the early years of the sample, i.e. 1992-1994,
the slope is 1 =0 21.T h i sc o e ﬃcient falls to 014 in the 1995-1998 subsample. Note
that this turns out to be a signiﬁcantly lower slope coeﬃcient. When forecasts from
the February and the July meetings are included jointly, the drop in the implied slope
coeﬃcient becomes even more pronounced. It falls from 013 in 1992-1994 to 005 in
1995-1998. This is a key result of the paper. The Phillips curve that is consistent
with each member’s submitted inﬂation forecasts ﬂattens in the second half of the
1990s.
Not surprisingly, the share of variation explained by this simple model is rather low.
The 2 falls to even lower levels in the later years of the sample. This also indicates
that the relationship that explains the link between the output gap and the inﬂation
forecast in the early years is no longer able account for the variation of inﬂation
forecasts.
Do Federal Reserve governors and regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents disagree
about the Phillips curve? Table (2) reports results for each group of FOMC members
separately. Interestingly, both groups exhibit coeﬃcients very similar to the overall
results from table (1). The fall in the Phillips curve slope appears to be slightly
more pronounced for Fed governors than for presidents, but this diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
3.2 The NAIRU as implied by FOMC forecasts
The aim of this section is to uncover the perception of the NAIRU implied by each
member’s forecast of inﬂation and the unemployment rate. For that purpose, we again
estimate a simple accelerationist Phillips curve regression. In contrast to the previous
section, however, we include the unemployment forecast as the real driving variable.
The forecast made at each July meeting for the calender year following the meeting,


|+18, is regressed on the July forecast for the current calender year, 

|+6,a n d







|+6 = 0 + 1

|+6 +  (3)
Note that all three forecasts entering this equation are formulated at the same FOMC
meeting. Based on the parameter estimates we can derive a rough implied estimate









As an alternative speciﬁcation, we also estimate this regression with the unemploy-







|+6 = 0 + 1

|+18 +  (5)
We are interested in how  evolves over time. It is well known that the equilibrium
rate of unemployment fell over the second half of the 1990s, see Staiger, Stock, and
Watson (2001). It is not clear, however, whether and when FOMC members, probably
apart from chairman Greenspan, perceived this fall of the NAIRU in real-time.
A ﬁrst impression can be obtained from a scatter plot of the unemployment forecast
against the change in the inﬂation forecast, see ﬁgure (1). Apparently, the relationship
became steeper towards the second half of the sample. The baseline regression results
are reported in table (3). For the full sample period, the estimated slope coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcantly negative with 1 = −018. Over time the Phillips curve based on
the unemployment forecast becomes steeper. The slope increases to −048 in the
1995-1998 subsample. Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) provide evidence of a ﬂatter
unemployment-based Phillips curve since the 1980s. Note that the time span we
have available here is substantially shorter than in Atkeson and Ohanian (2001). At
ﬁrst sight, however, the steeper Phillips curve disguises the change in the underlying
NAIRU, which is in this case more telling than the slope estimates. The implied 
falls from 693 in the early years to 542 in the later part of the sample. In 1996-1998
subsample the NAIRU falls further to 531. A simple Wald test conﬁrms that this is
as i g n i ﬁcantly lower . This range is consistent with the results based on aggregate
data obtained in the literature, see Staiger, Stock, and Watson (2001). Hence, the
results reveal that policymakers implicitly base their forecasts of unemployment and
inﬂa t i o no nas i g n i ﬁcantly lower NAIRU in the later part of the 1990s. Again, we
7can also distinguish between groups of FOMC members. Interestingly, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant drop in the implied NAIRU also for Fed governors, but not for regional
Federal Reserve presidents. The results from the alternative speciﬁcation (5), which
features 

|+18 instead of 

|+18, are shown in table (4) and suggest very similar
conclusions.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper investigates how monetary policymakers think about the short-run trade-
oﬀ between real activity and inﬂation, i.e. the Phillips curve. For this purpose,
forecasts for unemployment and inﬂation from each individual FOMC member over
the period 1992-1998 are used, which became available recently.
When submitting their forecasts, FOMC members appear to have implicitly revealed
as i g n i ﬁcant trade-oﬀ. The slope of the Phillips curve, however, is shown to change
over time. Inﬂation forecasts respond less to incoming output gap ﬁgures towards
the second half of the sample. Alternatively, the joint forecast for inﬂation and
unemployment is consistent with the perception of a falling NAIRU in the post-1995
subsample. The results, therefore, suggest that FOMC members took these changes
in the short-run trade-oﬀ into account.
In their assessment of the Greenspan era, Blinder and Reis (2005, p. 51) discuss the
FOMC’s information about the changing trend in productivity and ask "What did
Greenspan see that others failed to see?". Here we show that at least the other board
members shared his view. The regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents, however,
did not.
The present paper is a ﬁrst step to exploit individual FOMC forecasts in order to
extract policymakers’ beliefs about unemployment and inﬂation. Recent papers by
Capistrán (2008) and Ellison and Sargent (2009) use the central tendency of FOMC
forecasts to identify the degree auf caution and the preference for robustness of FOMC
members. The data set collected by Romer (2009) facilitates additional investigations
along these lines.
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10Table 1: The Phillips curve over diﬀerent sample periods
meeting|horizon sample parameter estimates Wald 2 #o b s
0 1 




1992 - 1994 007
(002)∗∗∗ 042
(005)∗∗∗ 0.21 53
1995 - 1998 025
(004)∗∗∗ −004
(003)
-0 . 0 26 7
Feb|+12 1992 - 1998 017
(004)∗∗∗ 003
(002)∗ 0.02 120
1992 - 1994 082
(022)∗∗∗ 021
(006)∗∗∗ 0.16 53
1995 - 1998 002
(005)
014
(005)∗∗∗ 0.05 0.11 67






1995 - 1998 013
(003)∗∗∗ 005
(003)∗ 0.03 0.02 135
Notes: Results from least-squares estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. A
signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗.T h eh y p o t h e s i s
of the Wald is 1 = 11992−1994. The column reports the -value.
11Table 2: The Phillips curve for diﬀerent groups of FOMC members
meeting|horizon group sample parameter estimates Wald 2 #o b s
0 1 
all Governors 1992 - 1998 014
(004)∗∗∗ 002
(001)∗ 0.04 72
1992 - 1994 040
(0161)∗∗∗ 010
(005)∗∗ 0.12 33









1992 - 1994 065
(012)∗∗∗ 014
(004)∗∗∗ 0.16 72
1995 - 1998 015
(004)∗∗∗ 005
(004)∗∗∗ 0.04 0.02 96
Notes: Results from least-squares estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. A
signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗.T h eh y p o t h e s i s
of the Wald is 1 = 11992−1994. The column reports the -value.
12Table 3: The NAIRU for diﬀe r e n ts a m p l ep e r i o d sa n dd i ﬀerent groups of FOMC
members
group sample parameter estimates implied Wald 2 #o b s
0 1  
all 1992 - 1998 114
(026)∗∗∗ −018
(003)∗∗∗ 633 0.19 120
1992 - 1994 208
(062)∗∗∗ −030
(009)∗∗∗ 693 0.18 53
1995 - 1998 260
(033)∗∗∗ −048
(006)∗∗∗ 542 009 0.47 67
1996 - 1998 324
(048)∗∗∗ −061
(010)∗∗∗ 531 009 0.46 50
Governors 1992 - 1998 126
(028)∗∗∗ −021
(005)∗∗∗ 6.00 0.37 36
1992 - 1994 161
(068)∗∗∗ −025
(010)∗∗ 6.44 0.28 17
1995 - 1998 259
(049)∗∗∗ −047
(009)∗∗∗ 5.51 012 0.60 19
1996 - 1998 374
(053)∗∗∗ −071
(010)∗∗∗ 5.27 008 0.79 14
Presidents 1992 - 1998 108
(027)∗∗∗ −017
(004)∗∗∗ 6.35 0.14 84
1992 - 1994 226
(086)∗∗ −032
(013)∗∗ 7.06 0.16 36
1995 - 1998 262
(042)∗∗∗ −048
(008)∗∗∗ 5.46 0.11 0.43 48
1996 - 1998 304
(064)∗∗∗ −057
(013)∗∗∗ 5.33 0.14 0.36 36
Notes: Results from least-squares estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. A
signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗.T h eh y p o t h e s i s
of the Wald is  = 
1992−1994. The column reports the -value.
13Table 4: The NAIRU for diﬀe r e n ts a m p l ep e r i o d sa n dd i ﬀerent groups of FOMC
members
group sample parameter estimates implied Wald 2 #o b s
0 1  
all 1992 - 1998 143
(024)∗∗∗ −023
(004)∗∗∗ 6.22 0.21 120
1992 - 1994 256
(082)∗∗∗ −039
(013)∗∗∗ 6.56 0.16 53
1995 - 1998 265
(035)∗∗∗ −048
(006)∗∗∗ 5.22 0.09 0.45 67
1996 - 1998 304
(048)∗∗∗ −056
(005)∗∗∗ 5.43 0.10 0.42 50
Governors 1992 - 1998 172
(033)∗∗∗ −029
(005)∗∗∗ 5.93 0.44 36
1992 - 1994 229
(082)∗∗∗ −036
(013)∗∗∗ 6.36 0.35 17
1995 - 1998 267
(051)∗∗∗ −047
(009)∗∗∗ 5.68 0.12 0.60 19
1996 - 1998 348
(057)∗∗∗ −064
(011)∗∗∗ 5.44 0.09 0.74 14
Presidents 1992 - 1998 130
(032)∗∗∗ −021
(005)∗∗∗ 6.19 0.15 84
1992 - 1994 263
(116)∗∗ −039
(018)∗∗ 6.74 0.12 36
1995 - 1998 268
(045)∗∗∗ −049
(009)∗∗∗ 5.47 0.11 0.41 48
1996 - 1998 288
(064)∗∗∗ −053
(013)∗∗∗ 5.43 0.16 0.34 36
Notes: Results from least-squares estimation. Standard errors in parenthesis. A
signiﬁcance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗,a n d∗.T h eh y p o t h e s i s
of the Wald is  = 























































































































































Figure 1: The relation between the unemployment forecast (

|+6) and the change




|+6) over alternative subsamples
15